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 “PS v Ontario: Rethinking The Role of the Charter in Civil Commitment” 
Isabel Grant* 




Abstract: In PS v Ontario, a five Justice panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal struck down the 
wording of the province’s Mental Health Act that authorized the involuntary committal of 
psychiatric patients for a period exceeding six months. This extraordinary order sought to 
remedy the fundamental injustice of not providing tribunal review of treatment and discharge 
planning decisions for long-term patients. The authors explore how the judgment can invigorate 
the important liberty interests at stake in civil commitment, and bridge the gap that has grown 
between civil and forensic mental health law. As the flaws identified by the Ontario Court appear 
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 I. Introduction 
Civil commitment regimes in every province and territory in Canada allow the state to 
detain individuals with a mental illness without their consent, usually on the basis that that 
individual presents a threat to themselves or to others, or is at risk of serious physical or mental 
deterioration.1 Such detentions must be renewed periodically and while there are limits on each 
                                                
* Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia The authors would like to thank Heather 
Burley and Kayla Strong for their diligent research and editing assistance on this paper.  We would also like to thank 
the anonymous reviewers of this article who made a number of helpful suggestions.  We dedicate this article to the 
late Professor Judith Mosoff who died in December 2015.  Professor Mosoff worked tirelessly, first as a lawyer and 
then as an academic, to improve the lives of persons with disabilities in Canada. Both authors have been inspired by 
her insights into mental health law, and by her friendship. 
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1 See for example: Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 22(3)(c)(ii); Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s 2; 
Mental Health Services Act, SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1, s 24(2)(a)(iii); Mental Health Act, SM 1998, c 36, s 
17(1)(b)(i); Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7, s 20(1.1); Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005, c 42, 
s 17; Mental Health Act, RSNB 1973, c M-10, s 8.1(1); Mental Health Care and Treatment Act, SNL 2006, c M-9.1, 
s 17(1)(b)(ii)(A); Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, s 13(1); Mental Health Act, RSY 2002, c 150, s 13(1); Mental 
Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c. M-10, s 13; Mental Health Act (Nunavut), RSNWT 1988, c M-10, s 14. Note: In 
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renewable period of detention, no jurisdiction has imposed a limit on the overall length of time 
an individual may be detained.  Every province and territory has a tribunal to which a civilly 
committed individual may apply to have his or her detention reviewed.2  
Civil commitment has been described as “the most significant deprivation of liberty 
without judicial process that is sanctioned by our society.”3 Some advocates hoped that the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms would serve as the catalyst for the reform of civil 
commitment laws and for a greater recognition of the liberty interests involved but, with a few 
exceptions, the Charter has not lived up to its billing.4 Professor Kaiser has called for a 
reassessment of coercive hospitalization and treatment as the centrepiece of mental health law 
given Canada’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.5 To 
date, neither courts nor legislatures have picked up on this call to action. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Quebec a physician may place a person under preventive confinement for up to 72 hours without authorization of 
the court and prior to psychiatric examination if he is of the opinion that the person presents a grave and immediate 
danger to himself and others: An Act Respecting the Protection of Persons Whose Mental State Presents a Danger to 
Themselves or to Others, CQLR c P-38.001, s 7 [“the Protection Act”].  With respect to deterioration, Ontario 
requires “serious physical impairment” to the individual (s. 20 (5)(a)(iii)) whereas British Columbia, by contrast, 
requires “substantial physical or mental deterioration” (s. 22(3)(c)(ii)). 
2 Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 25; Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s 41; Mental Health Services 
Act, SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1, s 34(8); Mental Health Act, SM 1998, c 36, s 56(1); Mental Health RSO Act, 1990, c 
M.7, s 39(1); Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005, c 42, s 68; Mental Health Care and Treatment Act, 
SNL 2006, c M-9.1, s 64(1)(a); Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, s 28(1); Mental Health Act, RSY 2002, c 150, s 
30(1). Note: NWT and Nunavut do not have a review tribunal and instead decisions on detention are made by a 
territorial judge. In Quebec, appeals are heard before the Tribunal Administratif du Québec: The Protection Act, 
supra note 1, s 21. In New Brunswick the tribunal reviews applications submitted by reviewing physicians for 
involuntary admission and then determines whether to confirm in writing an order for that person to be admitted as 
an involuntary patient: Mental Health Act, RSNB 1973, c M-10, s 8.1(1). 
3 Raj Anand, “Involuntary Civil Commitment in Ontario: The Need to Curtail the Abuses of Psychiatry” (1979) 57 
Can Bar Rev 250 at 251. 
4 H Archibald Kaiser, “Canadian Mental Health Law: the Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State” (2009) 17 
Health L J 139 at 148-149. One notable exception is the decision in Fleming v Reid, [1991] 4 OR (3d) 74, 82 DLR 
(4th) 298 where the Ontario Court of Appeal found that the existing treatment regime for persons deemed 
incompetent to consent to treatment violated section 7 of the Charter because it failed to consider previously 
expressed wishes made by the individual when competent. 
5 Convention on the Rights of Person with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 189 UNTS 137 [CRPD]; While the 
CRPD does not explicitly address involuntary hospitalization and treatment, Kaiser argues that some provisions 
bring the coercive nature of provincial Mental Health Acts into question. For example, he refers to article 17: “Every 
person with disabilities has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with 
others.”  H Archibald Kaiser, “Law and Psychiatry in the Age of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD)” in Richard D Schneider & Hy Bloom, eds, Law and mental disorder: a comprehensive and 
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There are three aspects of the civil commitment process that attract Charter scrutiny.  
First, the Charter has been used to challenge the criteria by which the commitment decision is 
made, usually by physicians. With one notable exception, judges have shown deference to 
legislators and to physicians in assessing the criteria for civil commitment.6 Second, the Charter 
can be used to challenge the statutory regime for nonconsensual treatment that may accompany 
civil commitment depending on the particular legislative regime in force in the province.7  
Finally, the procedures and powers of the review tribunal that exists in almost every jurisdiction 
to review civil commitment may be subject to a Charter challenge.  It is this last stage that is the 
focus of this paper.  
                                                                                                                                                       
practical approach (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013) 1333 at 1345 [Kaiser, “Law and Psychiatry”]. The Court of Appeal 
in PS does not refer to the CRPD.  Kaiser concludes, at 1345, that “[t]he CRPD demands no less than a tabula rasa 
study of the entire current system of Canadian involuntary measures, which are so firmly anchored in the now 
displaced or at least repositioned medical model.” See also H Archibald Kaiser, “The Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities: Beginning to Examine the Implications for Canadian Lawyers' Professional 
Responsibilities (2012) 20:2 Health Law Review 26.  The PS Court does not refer to the CRPD which has not 
garnered the attention of courts in Canada. 
6 See McCorkell v Riverview Hospital (Director), [1993] BCJ No 1518, 104 DLR (4th) 391 [McCorkell] where 
Justice Donald rejected a Charter challenge to the BC civil commitment criteria.  For a more detailed discussion of 
McCorkell, see text at footnote 69. See also Ref re Procedures and Mental Health Act (1984), 5 DLR (4th) 577, 8 
CRR 142, (sub nom Re Jenkins) 45 Nfld & PEIR 131, 132 APR 131 (PEICA) where the PEI Court of Appeal 
upheld the impugned legislation, finding that the provision on involuntary commitment did not constitute prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of mental disability under s 15(1) and that restrictions owing to the infirmity of people 
with mental disabilities were reasonable limits within s 1. Further, since involuntary patients under the Act may have 
the validity of their detention determined by habeus corpus, there was no violation of s 10. 
 Thompson and Empowerment Council v. Ontario, 2013 ONSC 5392. Thwaites v Health Sciences Centre 
Psychiatric Facility, [1988] 3 WWR 217 [Thwaites], was an early exception to this where the Manitoba Court of 
Appeal held that committal criteria failed to sufficiently define the persons who could be subject to committal and 
the circumstances under which they could be compulsorily detained. The standard at issue in Thwaites was 
extremely all-encompassing as the legislation provided that a person could be admitted as a compulsory patient if a 
qualified medical practitioner thought the person “should be admitted as a patient at a psychiatric facility”.  After the 
Thwaites decision, the government responded by amending the legislation to provide for an objective 
“dangerousness” test to be met prior to certifying involuntary admission. The legislation also provided a more 
specific definition of “mental disorder” and “mental retardation”. This amended legislation was upheld in Bobbie v 
Health Sciences Centre, [1988] MJ No 485, [1989] 56 Man R (2d) 208 (MBQB). 
7 In a landmark Ontario Court of Appeal decision, that Court struck down the provisions of Ontario's Mental Health 
Act that allowed the best interests of an incompetent individual to override his or her previously expressed 
competent wishes about treatment.  See Fleming v Reid, supra note 4.  This decision has not been used to invalidate 
much more invasive compulsory treatment regimes in provinces like British Columbia and Newfoundland: Mental 
Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 31(1); Mental Health Care and Treatment Act, SNL 2006, c M-9.1, s 35(1). 
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This paper addresses a groundbreaking decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which 
has required the Ontario government to revise significantly its civil commitment review tribunal 
and has the potential to prompt changes to the role of civil commitment review tribunals across 
Canada. In PS v Ontario,8 a five person bench of the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded 
that the civil commitment legislation in Ontario violated section 7 of the Charter because it 
provided for long term commitment without adequate procedural protections to protect the 
liberty interest of the person committed. The Court held that an individual could not be civilly 
committed beyond six months because the Consent and Capacity Review Board (the “CCB”), the 
tribunal that reviews commitment decisions in Ontario, did not have any jurisdiction to monitor 
and ensure that the appellant was receiving appropriate treatment and being held in conditions 
that were minimally restrictive of his liberty.  In this paper, we argue that the Court’s decision is 
broad enough to apply across Canada to all jurisdictions which have civil mental health tribunals 
and has the potential to change radically the landscape of civil commitment review tribunals in 
Canada. We also examine the Ontario government’s response to the PS decision and argue that, 
while the response will improve the plight of persons detained for more than six months, its 
narrow scope is likely to lead to further litigation around the protections given to those detained 
for shorter periods of time.9 
 
II.  PS v Ontario and Its National Scope 
A. The Facts  
                                                
8 2014 ONCA 900, [2014] 379 DLR (4th) 191 [PS]. 
9 When we refer to commitment of greater than six months in PS, we are actually referring to commitments that are 
longer than six months and two weeks, which is the actual time allowed for by the Ontario Court of Appeal's 
remedy.  See text accompanying note 49. 
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After serving a sentence of 45 months in Kingston Penitentiary for sexual assault against 
a 12 year-old boy, during which time he received no treatment or therapy,10 PS was civilly 
committed under Ontario’s Mental Health Act. He remained committed at the Oak Ridge 
division of Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre (now called the Waypoint Centre for Mental 
Health Care) for 19 years in circumstances that even his doctors conceded constituted mere 
warehousing.11 The appellant was deaf and had very limited ability to speak or understand 
spoken language. He communicated using a version of Signed English and some American Sign 
Language.12 PS spent his entire time in a maximum security wing at Waypoint Hearing after 
hearing by the CCB concluded that, while he met the conditions of civil commitment, he did not 
require placement in maximum security.  The CCB also found repeatedly that Waypoint did not 
have treatment programs suitable for someone with his limited communication skills. Year after 
year, medium security facilities declined to accept the appellant as an inpatient.13 PS was 56 
years old at the time of the hearing. 
 
B. The Practice of ‘Psychiatric Gating’ 
Why had PS been detained for such an extraordinarily long period of time? He was 
subject to a practice that is commonly referred to as psychiatric “gating.”14 Gating is a colloquial 
term used to describe the practice of civilly committing a person, who is identified as dangerous, 
at or near the end of a sentence of imprisonment.15  In effect, “gating” represents the use of civil 
                                                
10 PS, supra note 8 at para 7. 
11 Ibid at para 61. 
12 Ibid at para 6. 
13 Ibid at para 9.  
14 Yukimi Henry, “Psychiatric Gating: Questioning the Civil Committal of Convicted Sex Offenders” (2001) 59 UT 
Fac L Rev 229; Andres Hannah-Suarez, “Psychiatric Gating of Sexual Offenders under Ontario’s Mental Health 
Act: Illegality, Charter Conflicts and Abuse of Process” (2005-2006) 37 Ottawa L Rev 71. 
15 In several US states, “gating” has been accomplished by the passage of statutes authorizing the civil commitment 
of sexual offenders to psychiatric treatment facilities. In June, 2015, a Federal District Court Judge in Minnesota 
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commitment to continue to detain someone who can no longer be held by the criminal justice 
system, but is thought to present a danger to the public. It is used almost exclusively for sex 
offenders, whose sexual deviance can be labelled as a form of mental illness in order to satisfy 
the legal requirements of civil commitment. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld this practice in 
1995 in Starnaman v Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre16 as long as the individual meets 
the requirements for commitment prescribed by the Mental Health Act. The Court of Appeal in 
Starnaman rejected arguments that gating is an inappropriate use of the civil commitment system 
to augment the dangerous offender regime set out in the Criminal Code, and held that it was not 
contrary to section 7 of the Charter. Gating is controversial in part because serious doubts exist 
with respect to whether effective treatment regimes exist for personality disorders and disorders 
such as pedophilia. In other words, persons committed to hospital for personality and sexual 
disorders have little realistic opportunity of having a diagnosed condition remediated to the point 
of no longer meeting the civil commitment requirements.17 Thus, individuals who are “gated” 
may easily be warehoused as long-term detainees of psychiatric facilities.  While the decision in 
PS is not limited to those who have been “gated”, and applies to anyone detained involuntarily 
for more than six months, “gated” individuals are likely to become long term detainees.   
We have not been able to find any gating cases outside of Ontario. While this may be 
explained by different protocols and policies by health systems and practitioners in the other 
                                                                                                                                                       
ruled the civil commitment of sexual offenders at the end of their criminal sentences to be unconstitutional. Karsjens 
et al v Jenson et al, Civ No 11-3659 (D Minn. 2015) (Frank J, June 17, 2015). 
16 Starnaman v Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, [1995] 24 OR (3d) 701,100 CCC (3d) 190. The Ontario 
Divisional Court reached a similar result in Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v Stock, [1994] 116 DLR (4th) 
550, 1994 CanLII 7506 (Ont Gen Div). 
17 Professor Kaiser describes the intractable problem created by those who present a danger based on a personality 
disorder yet who are found to be criminally responsible: “The very nature of a personality disorder compared to 
psychosis virtually guarantees that there will be conflict and uncertainty at every level of the accused's experience 
with the criminal justice and mental health care systems.” H Archibald Kaiser, “R v Knoblauch: A Mishap at the 




provinces, it would also seem to be explained by the varying committal criteria used in 
jurisdictions around the country. Several jurisdictions incorporate into those criteria the 
requirement that the mental illness or disorder need treatment or be treatable by psychiatric 
care.18 Ontario has no such requirement.19 The Court of Appeal sat five justices in PS because it 
thought that the constitutionality of psychiatric gating, upheld in Starnaman, might need to be 
reconsidered.  In fact, the Court decided to focus on all long term detainees and did not address 
the constitutionality of gating. 
 
C. Jurisdiction of the Consent and Capacity Board 
The PS case deals with the decision-making authority of Ontario’s CCB, an 
administrative tribunal whose extensive jurisdiction in health care matters is unique among 
Canadian provinces. The CCB serves as a review tribunal for those who have been civilly 
committed to psychiatric facilities in Ontario, but it has several other functions as well. The CCB 
has decision-making authority with respect to reviews of medical determinations of incapacity to 
consent to treatment,20 the appointment of a representative to consent to treatment,21 the review 
of appointments of substitute decision-makers for incapable individuals, applications by 
substitute decision-makers to depart from the prior wishes of a person made during a period of 
capability,22 and review of consent given to the admission of incapable individuals to hospital 
facilities,23 all in addition to its review of civil commitment to psychiatric facilities and 
commitment to community treatment orders (“CTOs”) under the Ontario Mental Health Act. The 
                                                
18 See for example Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 22(3)(c); Mental Health Services Act, SS 1984-85-86, c 
M-13.1, s 24(2)(a)(i); and Mental Health Act, SM 1998, c 36, s 17(1)(b)(ii). 
19 Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7, s 20(5). 
20 Health Care Consent Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 2, Sch A, s 32. 
21 Ibid, s 33. 
22 Ibid, s 36. 
23 Ibid, s 34. 
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CCB has no counterpart in the rest of Canada24 where, generally speaking, civil mental health 
review tribunals have jurisdiction only to review civil commitment and, in some provinces, to 
review CTOs and applications by hospitals to override treatment refusals.25 Given its various 
roles, the CCB is a large tribunal, with an extensive jurisprudence.26 Prior to the changes 
prompted by the PS decision, the CCB had a narrowly defined jurisdiction to review civil 
commitment in Ontario, thus making it analogous to other provincial tribunals. It could order that 
the involuntary detention continue or it could order that the involuntary status be rescinded and 
the individual released. In 2010, the Ontario legislature gave the CCB the jurisdiction to order 
that an involuntary patient be transferred to another facility at certain points after at least nine 
months of civil commitment.27  
 
D. The Decision 
Superior Court of Justice 
PS brought a habeas corpus application to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking, 
among other things, a declaration that his rights had been violated under section 7 of the Charter. 
Justice McCarthy held that the decision in Starnaman had “conclusively” determined that the 
Mental Health Act does not offend against the procedural component of the principles of 
                                                
24  With the exception of the Yukon’s Capability and Consent Board, empowered under that Territory’s Care 
Consent Act, SY 2003, c 21, Sch B for purposes similar to the CCB in Ontario.  
25  In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, reviews of involuntary admission are conducted by the Supreme Court 
of the Northwest Territories, and the Nunavut Court of Justice, respectively: See Mental Health Act, RSNWT 1988, 
c M-10, s 26. Both Courts have the authority to “make any other order the judge considers appropriate” in addition 
to confirming or canceling the certificates of admission – see s 28(2)(c).  
26 In the 2014-2015 year, the CCB had 123 members, divided roughly equally between lawyers, psychiatrists and 
members of the public. The Board convened 3,586 hearings.  See “Annual Report of the CCB for 2014-2015 on the 
CCB website at http://www.ccboard.on.ca/scripts/english/index.asp.  Reasons for decisions of the CCB are found in 
CANLII.   
27 Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7, s 39.2. 
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fundamental justice.28 He found that PS had been properly admitted and that the CCB had 
regularly reviewed his involuntary status.29 Justice McCarthy found that, although PS was 
detained in a maximum security facility that was excessive for his needs, he enjoyed 
“uncommon” freedoms and privileges that were often tailored to his individual needs.30 In 
rejecting the argument that PS’s security interests were infringed, he found that PS had not 
suffered “any serious state imposed psychological harm or stress.”31 He also went on to reject 
PS’s argument that Waypoint’s failure to retain deafness experts to assist in his assessments and 
treatment left him unable to meaningfully participate in his rehabilitation, thereby lengthening 
his detention. Instead, Justice McCarthy found that the record was “replete with treatments and 
opportunities afforded to the Appellant.”32 He concluded his section 7 analysis by rejecting the 
argument that PS had merely been warehoused, and found that the evidence indicated that he has 
enjoyed a variety of opportunities and freedoms, transfer options had been explored, and that 
PS’s own failure to take action to initiate a transfer had contributed to his remaining at 
Waypoint.33 Accordingly, he held that the impugned provisions of the Mental Health Act and the 
actions of Waypoint had not infringed section 7 of the Charter.34 
PS also based his challenge to his continued involuntary detention and the conditions of 
his hospitalization on section 15(1) of the Charter, citing discrimination on the grounds of 
physical disability, i.e., deafness.  He presented evidence demonstrating that, throughout his 19 
years of involuntary committal, therapeutic interactions with him had generally been carried out 
without the provision of ASL interpreters. McCarthy J. concluded that the Supreme Court of 
                                                
28 S v Her Majesty the Queen, 2013 ONSC 2970 at para 43 [S v the Queen]. 
29 Ibid at para 45. 
30 Ibid at para 69. 
31 Ibid at para 72.  
32 Ibid at para 76. 
33 Ibid at para 86.  
34 Ibid at para 103.  
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Canada’s seminal ruling in Eldridge v BC,35 in which the Court said that equality required public 
hospitals to provide interpreters for deaf patients as part of delivering medical services, applied 
to PS’s circumstances. However, Justice McCarthy interpreted the Eldridge principle as 
requiring interpretation only for “significant therapeutic interventions”, which he believed had 
occurred on four specified occasions, prior to 2006. On none of those occasions, he noted, were 
the breaches “intentional.”36 At worst, PS was simply in an inappropriate facility for his needs.  
Justice McCarthy found no violations of section 15(1) since that time, and made no declaration 
with respect to section 15(1). PS appealed this decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal 
With respect to the section 7 issue, the Court of Appeal began by making a distinction 
between those individuals who are civilly committed for less than six months (roughly 98%), and 
those who are civilly committed for more than six months (roughly 2%).37 Relying on these 
statistics, the Court held that the focus of the CCB is on short-term committal and whether the 
patient meets the criteria for commitment.38 However, when that commitment extends beyond 
six months, the Charter requires that the Board have additional powers to deal with those 
commitments.39 
The Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged the significant deprivation of liberty 
involved in civil commitment. Even where protection of the public requires detention, “the state 
cannot detain people for significant periods of time without providing them with a fair 
                                                
35 [1997] 3 SCR 3. 
36 S v the Queen, supra note 28 at para 100. 
37 PS, supra note 8 at para 26. 
38 Ibid at para 193. 
39 Ibid at paras 128, 129, 197. 
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procedural process.”40 The Court acknowledged that the greater the impact on the liberty of the 
individual the greater the need for procedural protections and that “factual situations which are 
closer or analogous to criminal proceedings will merit greater vigilance by the courts.”41 This 
finding was particularly significant because it enabled the Court to rely heavily on jurisprudence 
involving various provincial Criminal Code Review Boards where concerns around the liberty 
interests of the accused have been much more front and centre than in the civil commitment 
context.  Criminal Code Review Boards have the power to impose conditions that relate to the 
provision of medical services and treatment and, by analogy, so must tribunals that review civil 
commitment: 
In sum, the case law suggests that in the non-punitive detention context, s. 7 
requires the body reviewing detention to have the procedures and powers 
necessary to render a decision that is minimally restrictive on liberty in light of 
the circumstances necessitating the detention.42 
 
By failing to give the CCB the necessary tools to protect the liberty interests of long term 
involuntary detainees, the Mental Health Act fails to ensure that “the liberty interest of the 
[detained individual is] built into the statutory framework.”43 Specifically, the Court held that the 
Board lacks the jurisdiction “to supervise security level, privileges, therapy and treatment of 
long-term detainees and to craft orders that would ensure an appropriate balance between public 
protection and the protection of detainees’ liberty interests.”44 
The Court rejected the argument that the new jurisdiction to transfer patients under 
section 39.2 was sufficient to uphold the legislation under section 7. The Board had no authority 
                                                
40 Ibid at para 78 citing R v Kobzar, 2012 ONCA 326 at para 57. 
41 Ibid at para 79 citing Dehghani v Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1993] 1 SCR 1053 at 1077, 
101 DLR (4th) 654.  
42 Ibid at para 92. 
43 Ibid at para 115 citing Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre v Ontario (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 20 at para 
53, [2004] 1 SCR 498. 
44 Ibid at para 115. 
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to order that the individual be transferred to a different level of security within a detaining 
institution, to transfer the individual to another hospital with conditions, or to increase access to 
the community or order conditions to prepare for gradual release.45  The Mental Health Act must 
provide the Board with sufficient flexibility to ensure that individuals are not subjected to overly 
restrictive or prolonged detentions and to make sure that the individual’s treatment is moving 
them towards reintegration into society. The Court of Appeal envisaged a review mechanism that 
would allow the Board to examine basic questions as to “where and how a person is detained and 
how they are discharged into the community.”46  One example of the inadequacy of the Board’s 
powers was the fact that the Mental Health Act did not give the CCB the power to issue a 
community treatment order as an alternative to detention for an individual certified as an 
involuntary patient.”47  
The Court crafted a simple but elegant remedy in this case, pursuant to section 52(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Rather than invalidating the civil commitment regime, it focused on 
the provisions that provided for renewals beyond six months. By severing the words “or 
subsequent”, renewals beyond six months are disallowed.48 Section 20(4) provided as follows: 
An involuntary patient may be detained, restrained, observed and examined in a 
psychiatric facility,  
(a) for not more than two weeks under a certificate of involuntary admission; and 
(b) for not more than,  
(i) one additional month under a first certificate of renewal, 
(ii) two additional months under a second certificate of renewal, and 
                                                
45 Ibid at para 126. 
46 Ibid at para 127. 
47 Ibid at para 127.  As will be discussed below this is one deficiency identified by the Court of Appeal that was not 
addressed in the Ontario government's amendments.  See Part III B, below. 
48 Ibid at para 202. 
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(iii) three additional months under a third or subsequent certificate of renewal,…49 
 
Because the Board only had jurisdiction to order a transfer after approximately 9 months, the 
Court held that the transfer provision would no longer be applicable because individuals could 
not be committed for nine months. The Court left for another day whether problems of the kind 
encountered in this case could arise in short-term civil commitment.50 The Court suspended the 
operation of its remedy for a period of 12 months so that the Ontario government could consider 
how to review its legislative regime.51  
With respect to the equality rights claim, again the Court of Appeal unanimously found in 
PS’s favour.  The Court of Appeal rejected the “significant intervention” test as being too narrow 
for this form of discrimination.  The Court stated that properly interpreted, Eldridge had 
established a threshold of “effective communication”, and that in the context of civil 
commitment, this had a particularly strong content.  Justice Sharpe described the implications as 
follows:52 
 I note here that s. 15(1) does not require “24/7” interpretation services for all aspects of 
daily living, but in the context of involuntary detention, it certainly does require a degree 
of accommodation beyond the context of significant therapeutic services and interactions. 
In Eldridge, the court held, at para. 82, that the “‘effective communication’ standard is a 
flexible one, and will take into consideration such factors as the complexity and 
importance of the information to be communicated, the context in which the 
communications will take place and the number of people involved.” The means for 
effective communication does not have to be provided at all times and in every situation. 
 
   However, statutorily-mandated detention renders detainees entirely dependent upon the 
hospital, whether privately or publicly operated, for essential services and treatment. In 
my view, in the context of detention, the flexible Eldridge standard of “effective 
communication” mandates the regular provision of communication through deaf 
                                                
49 The Court apparently overlooked the fact that the remedy ordered here actually allows for commitment beyond six 
months since there is the initial two weeks, followed by one month, an additional two months, and finally three more 
months which makes for a total of six months and two weeks. 
50 PS, supra note 8 at para 204.  
51 Ibid at para 206. 
52 Ibid at paras 147-148. 
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appropriate services in order to ensure that the detainees’ basic and fundamental personal 
needs are being fully understood and consistently addressed. 
 
The Court went on to say that the applications judge had erred by finding violations of PS’s 
section 15 rights only on isolated occasions, in the face of evidence that hospital authorities had 
relied for years on written communication with PS despite being aware that he was functionally 
illiterate and required ASL interpretation for comprehension. The Court made a particular point 
of noting the importance of using interpreters for effective communication of requests for 
consent to treatment, something the facilities had consistently failed to do. 
 With respect to its ruling that PS’s equality rights had been consistently and unjustifiably 
violated over a period of years, the Court made an order for declaratory relief as follows, 
pursuant to the remedial power in section 24(1) of the Charter:53   
(1) that the appellant’s s. 15(1) rights have been violated, and  
(2) setting out in general terms the nature and extent of his entitlement under s. 15(1), 
namely, that Ontario and Waypoint are required to provide the necessary and 
appropriate communication services that will ensure: (i) that the appellant’s basic and 
fundamental personal needs as a detainee are fully understood and addressed, and (ii) 
that the appellant is able to communicate effectively to access the therapeutic, 
treatment and other programs offered to hearing detainees. 
PS represents the most fulsome elaboration by a Canadian appellate court of the Eldridge 
principles with respect to access to equal public services by deaf persons, and indeed by persons 
with disabilities generally. 
 
E.  National Significance of PS v Ontario 
Given that PS has binding force only in Ontario, why should academics and lawyers 
outside Ontario still take heed of this important decision?  While the mental health regime in 
Ontario is unique, features of Ontario’s legislation germane to the reasoning in PS are common 
                                                
53  Ibid at para 207. 
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to most provincial and territorial mental health statutes.54 In other words, the shortcomings 
identified by the Ontario Court of Appeal in PS exist across the country.  Every province and 
territory provides for civil commitment which can last longer than six months.55 For example, in 
British Columbia, an individual can be detained for one month, renewed for a second month, 
then three months followed by an unlimited number of six-month renewals.56 Nova Scotia is 
similar except no single renewal is for more than three months.57 None of these jurisdictions puts 
a limit on how long a person can be detained. Some provinces provide a role for the tribunal in 
reviewing treatment decisions58 while others limit their review tribunals to reviewing the status 
of civil commitment and release.59 In British Columbia, for example, the civil review tribunal 
only has the jurisdiction to review detention, although this extends to those on extended leave.60 
Unlike in Ontario, the BC statute gives the review panel no jurisdiction whatsoever regarding 
treatment which, for those with involuntary status, can be imposed without consent.61 Further, no 
provincial mental health legislation in Canada provides the kind of jurisdiction envisaged by the 
                                                
54  We confine our general remarks to Canada’s common law jurisdictions. Mental health law in Quebec has distinct 
features owing both to its civil law system and the role of an omnibus administrative tribunal, the Administrative 
Tribunal of Quebec. Civil mental health law in Quebec is governed by provisions of that province’s Civil Code, the 
Code of Civil Procedure, and the Protection Act, supra note 1. Beyond an initial 72 hour period of hospital 
confinement, a person is subject to involuntary admission only by virtue of a court order, and for a period specified 
by the court (subject to renewal).  The individual may seek a review of the order of confinement before the 
Administrative Tribunal of Quebec (the “ATQ”), the tribunal that conducts administrative reviews across many 
areas of public governance in Quebec. The ATQ also acts as the forensic review board in Quebec for purposes of 
Part XX.1 (“Mental Disorder”) of the Criminal Code. 
55 Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24(1)(c); Mental Health Act, RSA 2000, c M-13, s 8(3)(c); Mental 
Health Services Act, SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1, ss 23(7), 24.1; Mental Health Act, SM 1998, c 36, s 21(4); Mental 
Health Act, RSO 1990, c M7, s 20(4)(b)(iii); Civil Code of Québec, SQ 1991, c 64, s 30.1; Involuntary Psychiatric 
Treatment Act, SNS 2005, c 42, s 22; Mental Health Act, RSNB 1973, c M-10, s 13(1)(c); Mental Health Care and 
Treatment Act, SN 2006, c M-9.1, s 31(1)(c); Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, ss 16(3)(b), 16(3)(c); Mental 
Health Act, RSY 2002, c 150, s 16(1); Mental Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c M-10, s 23.2(1); Mental Health Act 
(Nunavut), RSNWT 1988, c M-10, s 23.2(1). 
56 Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24(1). 
57 Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005, c 42, s 22. 
58 Mental Health Act, SM 1998, c 36, s 30(5); Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, s 24(4).  
59 See, for example, British Columbia (Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 25(2)) and Saskatchewan (Mental 
Health Services Act, SS 1984-85-86, c M-13.1, s 34(8)). 
60 Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, ss 25(2), 39(1). 
61 Ibid s 31. 
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Ontario Court of Appeal in PS to supervise the conditions of long-term commitment. Nor does 
any provincial review tribunal, outside of Ontario, have the authority to transfer the patient to 
another facility, although PEI and the Yukon provide for review of a physician’s transfer 
decision,62 and New Brunswick requires the review tribunal to approve transfers to another 
jurisdiction.63 The changes following PS in Ontario mean that Ontario is the only province in 
Canada that provides significant procedural protections to long-term civilly committed 
individuals.  
We have seen small steps towards expanding the jurisdiction of review tribunals in some 
provinces. Nova Scotia, for example, allows the Review Board to review community treatment 
orders.64 In general, when the Review Board is considering an application to review detention or 
a community treatment order, it may make “such recommendations to the chief executive officer 
as it sees fit respecting the treatment or care of a patient.”65 However, the statute stops short of 
giving the Board the jurisdiction to make orders regarding treatment or other conditions of 
detention as the chief executive officer is not required to implement any of the recommendations 
made by the tribunal.66 Prince Edward Island has a unique provision guaranteeing certain 
communication rights on the part of the patient and the tribunal can review denial of those 
rights.67 Despite these exceptions, no province outside Ontario has the kinds of powers required 
as a matter of constitutional law by the PS Court.  No province has for example, the power to 
order transfers to lower levels of custody, the power to release an individual on conditions or on 
a community treatment order rather than prolonging detention, the power to scrutinize the 
                                                
62 Mental Health Act, SPEI 1994, c 39, 28(1)(g); Mental Health Act, RSY 2002, c 150, s 24(2). 
63  Mental Health Act, RSNB 1973, c M-10, s 27. New Brunswick has a somewhat unique regime in which a 
physician must apply to the review board in order to have a person admitted to a psychiatric facility although the 
person may be detained and treated pending the tribunal’s decision. 
64 Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, SNS 2005, c 42, ss 58, 76(2)(f). 
65 Ibid, s 68(2). 
66 Ibid. 
67 Mental Health Act, RSPEI 1988, c M-6.1, ss 33(2), 28(1)(h). 
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freedom of movement within the facility and its surrounding community, and the power to 
scrutinize treatment plans to ensure that the individual is making progress towards reintegration 
into the community. PS provides important ammunition for challenging all these shortcomings in 
provincial and territorial regimes. 
 
III. Commentary 
In this commentary, we wish to outline the significance of the ruling in PS for enhanced 
administrative supervision of the civil mental health system in Ontario, and for the systems in all 
common law provinces.  We focus on the systemic section 7 issue, rather than on the 
individualized section 15 claim which was unique to PS.   
We begin by demonstrating that the most significant aspect of the Court’s decision was 
its reliance on the Criminal Code Review Board jurisprudence. We then move on to examine the 
response to PS recently enacted by the Ontario government and demonstrate that, while the 
changes are progressive and important for long-term detainees, the response  stops short of fully 
vindicating section 7 liberty interests and may even raise its own section 15 concerns for persons 
civilly committed for shorter periods of time.  Finally, we speculate on a broader role for 
administrative tribunals in the mental health field generated by the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. 
Specifically, we raise the possibility of according review responsibility to tribunals with respect 
to important liberty interests of civilly committed individuals, which are put in jeopardy by 
ongoing use in psychiatric hospitals of measures such as physical restraint and seclusion. In turn, 
this leads us to a brief consideration of an issue raised but not resolved in PS – the jurisdiction of 
mental health review tribunals to address and remedy breaches of a civilly committed 
individual’s Charter rights. In our view, a move in the direction of an increased role for 
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independent review tribunals in mental health, especially in the areas of discharge planning and 
conditions and levels of hospital security, is overdue. Such broad jurisdiction responds more 
appropriately to the constitutional interests of liberty and security of person of individuals 
involuntarily detained in psychiatric facilities across Canada.   
 
A. Reliance on the Criminal Code Review Board Model 
In 1991, Professor Isabel Grant wrote about the importance of recognizing the coercive 
nature of civil commitment through analogizing to the deprivations of liberty involved in the 
criminal justice system.68 In PS, the Ontario Court of Appeal takes a step in that direction by 
relying heavily on the jurisprudence under the Criminal Code Review Board thus revitalizing the 
judicial understanding of civil commitment. In our view this is the most significant implication 
of the decision. The Court’s reliance on case law dealing with the Criminal Code Review Board, 
a tribunal established in each province under the Criminal Code to make decisions regarding 
persons found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (“NCRMD”) or unfit to 
stand trial, enables the Court to recognize the serious deprivation of liberty involved in civil 
commitment. This is in complete contrast to the approach taken by Justice Donald in the BC 
Supreme Court in an earlier Charter challenge to the criteria justifying civil commitment. In 
McCorkell, Justice Donald applied a much more paternalistic approach to civil commitment to 
justify the lack of procedural protections on the basis that the system is aimed at helping people 
                                                
68 Isabel Grant, “Mental Health Law and the Courts” (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall L J 747.  Grant’s paper was written 
before the creation of the Criminal Code Review Board and thus the author focused on criminal law more broadly.  
Since that time, the Supreme Court of Canada has differentiated the Criminal Code Review Board from the criminal 
trial process more broadly because of its inquisitorial nature.  Winko v Forensic Psychiatric Institute, [1999] 2 SCR 
625, 175 DLR (4th) 193 [Winko].However the PS court focuses its analysis on the connection between the Criminal 
Code Review Board and mental health tribunals.   
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who are sick.  The analogy to criminal law procedural protections was not relevant to the civil 
commitment context because of these different rationales: 
It is necessary at this point to repeat what I said earlier concerning the use of 
criminal cases to decide a mental health matter: the objects and purposes of 
criminal law and mental health legislation are so different that cases in one area 
will be of little guidance in the other. A protective statute and a penal statute 
operate in dramatically dissimilar contexts. Strict and narrow criteria for the 
detention of persons in a criminal law context reflect our society’s notions of 
fundamental justice for an accused person and protection of the public is a 
foremost consideration. But in the field of mental health, the same criteria would 
defeat the purpose of the legislation which is to help seriously mentally ill people 
in need of protection.69 
 
The Court failed to recognize that even a statue with a “protective” purpose can have the same 
effect on the individual as a punitive statute and thus should trigger the same liberty interests.70  
Two years prior to McCorkell, the law concerning the criminal or forensic psychiatry 
system had been sent on a striking new trajectory. In R v Swain,71 the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled that the Criminal Code provisions that provided for immediate and indefinite detention of a 
person found to have been NCRMD at the time of committing an offence, without assessment of 
their mental condition at the time of disposition, unjustifiably infringed both sections 7 and 9 of 
the Charter. The Court’s decision in Swain effectively endorsed a package of reform measures 
that were enacted shortly thereafter as Section XX.1 of the Criminal Code, the “Mental 
Disorder” provisions. Central to the reform package was the empowering of Review Boards, to 
be constituted at the provincial level, for the purpose of supervising the progress of NCRMD 
detainees in the forensic psychiatric hospital system.  These Boards have authority to rule on 
                                                
69 McCorkell, supra note 6 at para 63. 
70 See for example: Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 56 DLR (4th) 1; Canada 
(Attorney General) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134. 
71 [1991] 1 SCR 933, 5 CR (4th) 253. 
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issues of discharge, conditions of discharge, security levels within hospital custody, and 
treatment planning. 
In PS, the Ontario Court of Appeal revisited and relied on the reasoning of Swain. In 
particular, the Court found that the Supreme Court’s understanding of the procedural aspects of 
fundamental justice in circumstances where the state acts to detain individuals were applicable to 
civil committal, at least so far as it relates to long-term involuntary patients. The Court of Appeal 
cited the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2007 decision in Charkaoui v. Canada72 concerning the 
statutory scheme for detaining and deporting non-citizens believed to pose national security 
threats to Canada, quoting in particular the Supreme Court’s statement that section 7 requires 
that detention for an extended period “must be accompanied by a meaningful process of review 
that takes into account the context and circumstances of the individual case.”73     
In the 25 years following Swain, Canadian courts have recognized forensic Review 
Boards as having an important role in protecting the liberty interests of NCR accused and those 
found unfit to stand trial. In fact, it was as a result of a decision in the context of the Ontario 
Review Board that the Charter jurisdiction of Canadian administrative tribunals in general was 
confirmed. In R v Conway74 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Review Board had 
jurisdiction to decide issues of law, and thus had Charter jurisdiction. The Court described the 
broad role of the Review Board in these terms: 
The Board is a quasi-judicial body with significant authority over a vulnerable 
population. It is unquestionably authorized to decide questions of law. It was 
established by, and operates under, Part XXI of the Criminal Code as a 
specialized statutory tribunal with ongoing supervisory jurisdiction over the 
treatment, assessment, detention and discharge of those accused who have been 
                                                
72 2007 SCC 9, [2007] 1 SCR 350. 
73 Ibid at para 107. 
74 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 SCR 765 [Conway]. 
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found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (“NCR 
patient”).75 
 
Criminal Code Review Boards regularly assess the levels of custody in which an 
individual is detained and the level of privileges an individual is allowed to experience. By 
contrast, civil tribunals rarely have any jurisdiction to assess whether the hospitalization is doing 
anything positive for the individual or moving him or her closer to discharge.  PS provided a 
stark demonstration of the impact of the lack of a similar jurisdiction on the civil mental health 
side in Ontario. Year after year the CCB told the medical staff that PS did not need maximum 
security and yet year after year he continued to be detained, untreated, in maximum security: an 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty that the CCB was powerless to address. It took a case 
about psychiatric gating, arising out of the criminal justice system, to get the Court to explicitly 
acknowledge the connection between coercive deprivations of liberty in the criminal system and 
coercive deprivations of liberty through civil commitment.  
The Criminal Code Review Board’s powers with respect to scrutinizing treatment 
decisions are not explicitly given to the Review Board in the Criminal Code, but rather are 
inferred from the Board’s broad jurisdiction to make decisions about the risk the accused 
presents to the community and to reintegrate the accused.76 The supervisory power given to the 
Review Board was not inevitable but rather the result of deliberate choices by the courts. For 
                                                
75 Ibid at para 84 (per Abella J). Note that in Conway, the Supreme Court ruled that even though the Ontario Review 
Board had Charter jurisdiction and was a “court of competent jurisdiction” for purposes of section 24(1), its 
remedial authority under that provision was limited to the orders it was authorized to make by its parent statute, i.e., 
the Criminal Code. This is a further limitation on the scope of tribunal jurisdiction in Charter matters that 
complicates the field.  
76 It is important to acknowledge that Parliament has made significant revisions to the disposition provisions that are 
applied by the Criminal Code Review Board, most significantly removing the requirements that the board impose 
the least restrictive option when imposing a disposition. Now the board is instructed to give priority to the safety of 
the public and the accused's liberty interest has been given less weight. This is particularly problematic given the 
Supreme Court of Canada's reliance on the least restrictive requirement to uphold the disposition provisions under 
the Charter in Winko, supra note 68. It remains to be seen how this change will affect the scope of the Board's 
jurisdiction.  For further discussion, see Lisa Grantham, “Bill C-14: A Step Backwards for the Rights of Mentally 
Disordered Offenders in the Canadian Criminal Justice System”, (2014) 19 Appeal 63. 
23 
 
example, in Mazzei v British Columbia (Director of Adult Forensic Psychiatric Services),77 the 
Court upheld the BC Review Board’s order that the treating hospital develop a comprehensive 
treatment plan for the patient and “undertake assertive efforts to enroll the accused in a culturally 
appropriate treatment program.”78 While Mazzei made clear that it was not the job of the Review 
Board to prescribe specific treatments, the Court held that “Review Boards have the power to 
bind hospital authorities and to impose binding conditions regarding or supervising (but not 
prescribing or imposing) medical treatment for an NCR accused.”79 The role of the Board is to 
make sure that there is an appropriate treatment plan in place that is moving the individual 
towards reintegration in the community.80 
The fact that the Court of Appeal was willing to consider the Criminal Code Review 
Board jurisprudence opens the door to a much higher level of scrutiny of the individual’s liberty 
interests. We argue that the forensic model is the most appropriate model for common law 
jurisdictions for ensuring adequate protection of liberty.  The power of the Review Board to, for 
example, ensure that the individual has an appropriate treatment plan has not impeded physicians 
in treating individuals found not criminally responsible or unfit. Rather, this jurisdiction has 
served as a check on the unfettered powers of the treating psychiatrists and hospital 
administrators.  Counsel for Ontario in PS had argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in R v 
                                                
77 2006 SCC 7, [2006] 1 SCR 326 [Mazzei].  
78 Ibid at para 4. 
79 Ibid at para 7. 
80 We are not suggesting that the plight of individuals detained in the forensic system is ideal by any means nor that 
an expansive approach to Review Board jurisdiction has been a panacea for all the problems of the forensic system.  
See for example, H Archibald Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory for Not Criminally Responsible Accused” 
(2010) 75 CR (6th) 241 at 241 [Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory”]. Kaiser notes that “some accused face 
huge obstacles in obtaining the kind of treatment they desire, and the promise of eventual liberty and reintegration 
remains unfulfilled for them.”  Kaiser laments the long periods of detention that the courts appear to be willing to 
tolerate in the forensic context and the refusal to consider proportionality as a limiting factor.  Conway himself had 
spent 26 years in custody. H Archibald Kaiser, “Mazzei: Constrained Progress in Construing Review Board 
Powers”, (2006) 36 CR (6th) 37. 
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Conception,81 which recognized a forensic hospital’s limited right to refuse to accept a patient 
referred to it under the Criminal Code, supported the idea that hospital personnel have plenary 
authority over treatment decision-making. Justice Sharpe rejected this argument: 
Conception certainly does not detract from the long line of authority discussed 
above as to the need for ongoing supervisory review of the treatment of NCR 
accused and those found unfit to stand trial: see Mazzei, at paras. 40-41, 
and Penetanguishene, at para. 67. Nor does it stand for the proposition advanced 
by Ontario that by conferring discretion on health care professionals, a statute 
such as the MHA can somehow avoid the need for an effective review 
mechanism.82 
In our view, the decision in PS was made possible by the recognition that significant 
deprivations of liberty by the state in the civil commitment context are analogous to those in the 
forensic context where someone is being detained in the absence of a criminal conviction. In 
other words, the Court recognized the coercive nature of civil commitment regardless of whether 
it is being used for the so-called benefit of the individual or the state.  The notion that an 
individual who has been civilly committed has fewer liberty interests flowing from the detention, 
as compared to someone in the forensic system, simply because they have not been charged with 
a crime cannot be justified.   
B. The Ontario Government’s Response to PS 
The Amendments 
Ontario had a number of options open to it in response to the decision in PS.  It could 
have simply done nothing and allowed the suspended declaration of invalidity to take effect thus 
prohibiting civil commitment beyond six months.  Doing nothing was likely an unpopular option 
with the government because it would raise the possibility that individuals who were identified 
                                                
81  2014 SCC 60, [2014] 3 SCR No 82. 
82 PS, supra note 8 at para 121. 
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as dangerous, but who had been detained longer than six months, would have to be at a minimum 
decertified as soon as the declaration of invalidity took effect.  Ontario could also have extended 
the CCB powers for all civilly committed individuals or, alternatively, for all individuals in a 
psychiatric facility for more than six months, whether voluntary or involuntary.  This would have 
been a more expensive, and we will argue preferable, solution and one that would have gone 
beyond the strict requirements of PS. 
Instead the Ontario government designed a solution that applied specifically to those who 
were committed for periods longer than the six months allowed by PS.  Section 20(1.1) of the 
Mental Health Act now provides for a new mechanism, a “certificate of continuation”, which  
provides for the continued detention of  those who have reached the maximum number of three 
“certificates of renewal”  of civil commitment under s. 20(4), adding up to six months detention 
following an initial period of two weeks.  The criteria for a certificate of continuation are the 
same as those for civil commitment.  Certificates of continuation authorize detention for a further 
period of three months, and can be renewed an indefinite number of times.  With respect to each 
certificate of continuation or renewal, the person concerned or someone on his or her behalf can 
apply to the CCB for an inquiry as to whether committal criteria continue to be met. As with 
certificates of renewal, the Board may rescind a certificate of continuation should it find that 
committal criteria are not met.83 The statute also provides that an application for review shall be 
deemed to be made by a patient on the completion of a first certificate of continuation, and every 
fourth such certificate thereafter.84  
                                                
83  Mental Health Act, RSO 1990, c M.7, ss 41(3) and (4). 
84  Ibid, s 39(4). Section 39(5) provides that a patient cannot waive deemed applications.  
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The centerpiece of the amendments is found in new section 41.1(2) of the Mental Health 
Act. It states that should the Board confirm a certificate of continuation, the patient or someone 
on his or her behalf may request the Board to make one or more of the following orders:85 
1. Transfer the patient to another psychiatric facility,… but only if the patient 
does not object. 
2. Place the patient on a leave of absence for a designated period on the advice of 
a physician  … 
3. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the patient 
with a different security level or different privileges within or outside the 
psychiatric facility. 
4. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to allow the patient to be 
provided with supervised or unsupervised access to the community. 
5. Direct the officer in charge of the psychiatric facility to provide the patient 
with vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative services.  
 
The Board may make any or all of these five orders on its own motion, even where not 
requested to do so, but is expressly barred from making any other order. Section 42(2) 
lists the parties to a hearing on a certificate of continuation, including the Minister 
should he or she wish to appear, and parties may seek a variance of the Board’s orders 
during a continuation period on the basis of a change “in material circumstances.” 
Barring such a change, a patient is limited to making only one application under section 
41.1(2) every 12 months.86  
The CCB is required to impose the order that is the least restrictive given the 
circumstances justifying detention.87 Apart from this statement, however, the amendments reflect 
a remarkable caution about trusting the CCB to exercise its new discretionary powers in a 
responsible fashion.  The CCB must consider the safety of the public, the ability of the facility to 
                                                
85 Ibid, s 41.1(2). 
86 Ibid, s 39(7). 
87 Ibid, s 41.1(3).  This is particularly striking given that the Harper government amended the Criminal Code 
provisions dealing with the Criminal Code review board such that the board no longer is required to grant the least 
restrictive disposition. See: Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 s 672.54, as amended by SC 2014, c 6, s 9. 
27 
 
manage and provide care for the individual, the mental condition of the individual, reintegration 
into society and any other needs of the individual.  The Board has no jurisdiction to require a 
physician to provide treatment88 although the Board can order an independent assessment of the 
individual’s “mental condition or his or her vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative needs.”89 
The officer in charge of the facility is given the authority to act contrary to an order of the CCB 
if there is a risk of serious bodily harm to the individual or anyone else90 although this power is 
temporary and the officer in charge must apply to the CCB within seven days to cancel or vary 
its order Ontario has not given its tribunal the power to issue a community treatment order as an 
alternative to detention, a power specifically found to be lacking by the PS Court.91 
 
Assessing Ontario’s Response 
In our view, the amendments meet in a narrow fashion the constitutional problems 
identified by the Court with respect to section 7 of the Charter. The Legislature has granted 
authority to the CCB that gives it a form of supervisory role in treatment planning for long-term 
patients. In so doing, Ontario has further distinguished its mental health legislation from that of 
other provinces in the area of protection of patients’ rights.  Ontario stands out as a leader when 
it comes to protecting the liberty interests of long-term detainees.  However, the amendments are 
couched in terms that limit the positive impact they might otherwise have.  We have two primary 
concerns.  First, the government has failed to address the fact that the line between involuntary 
and voluntary “patients” is not always a clear one and manipulation of this distinction could 
                                                
88 Ibid, s 41.1(4). 
89 Ibid, s 41.1(8). 
90 Ibid, s 41.2(1). 
91 PS, supra note 8 at para 127. 
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undermine the new protections granted.  Second, we have serious concerns about limiting the 
scope of procedural protections to those who are detained for longer than six months. 
It is widely believed by mental health law advocates that there is considerable 
manipulation of an individual’s status as a voluntary or involuntary “patient” in psychiatric 
facilities.  Decertifying an individual may be a technique used to render a legal dispute moot and, 
in the context of these new provisions, could potentially be used to deny access to the enhanced 
powers of the CCB that accompany a certificate of continuation. In PS specifically, the applicant 
lost his access to the CCB because he was decertified and made “voluntary” even though he was 
told he would be certified as involuntary if he tried to leave the facility.  This problem can arise 
even in the absence of deliberate manipulation of the system.  An individual’s mental state may 
vary over time justifying periods of decertification to a voluntary status.  Many individuals, like 
PS, may have their status changed more than once during a hospitalization; others may have brief 
periods in the community over the course of what is otherwise a long-term hospitalization.  This 
potential for movement between two statuses raises important concerns.  Will even a brief period 
of decertification after civil commitment trigger the civil commitment process again, thus 
allowing the certificate of continuation mechanism to be avoided?  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
explicitly ruled out the possibility that an individual could be decertified before six months and 
then immediately recertified to start the clock running again: 
Needless to say, it would not be acceptable to circumvent the time-limited 
duration of a committal by simply restarting the process with a new certificate of 
involuntary admission upon the expiry of the three-month period contemplated by 
s. 20(4)(b)(iii).92 
 
                                                
92 Ibid at para 203.  
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While the PS Court indicated that this was not an appropriate way to respond to PS, there is 
nothing in the statute that prevents such status changes.  Given that any one individual may go 
back and forth between the two different statuses, it would be desirable to have some mechanism 
to review the circumstances of anyone who has been hospitalized for more than six months, 
regardless of their status. 93 Given that the incidence of long-term psychiatric hospitalizations has 
decreased significantly in recent decades, the safeguard should not be prohibitively expensive. 
While Ontario has improved the plight of long-term detainees, it has not closed the door 
to further litigation on the procedures for review of civil commitments of less than six months.   
In our view, limiting amendments to long-term involuntary commitment will only create 
uncertainty and put an undue onus on persons who are civilly committed for shorter periods of 
time to litigate the scope of their liberty and security interests. The Court’s use of a six-month 
cutoff period (or to put it another way, its restricting the ruling to “long-term committals” 
defined as 6 months) is open to criticism as arbitrary. The Court arrived at this time period 
through analyzing statistics, which demonstrated that 98% of patients are released before six 
months and only 2% are detained beyond six months.94 The Ontario government’s response 
draws a clear line at the six-month cutoff.  However, it is not entirely clear why these 
percentages are relevant to the cut off point for protecting the liberty interests of an individual. 
The fact that only a small number of people are detained beyond six months has no coherent 
connection to the liberty interests of the majority released before six months. Would it be 
appropriate to detain an individual in maximum security where he or she does not need that level 
of custody for five months, or even one month? Is it acceptable to deny civilly committed 
                                                
93 In the committee hearings about Bill 122, advocacy groups expressed concern about individuals who are being 
held “voluntarily” yet who face the threat of civil commitment. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of 
Debates (Hansard), 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 125 (25 November 2015) at 772-773 (J Meadus) and 775-776 (K 
Spector). 
94 PS, supra note 8 at para 26. 
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persons appropriate treatment tailored to their disability for three months? When one considers 
the revolving door syndrome, and the fact that people who are detained for short periods may 
well be readmitted subsequently, many individuals may spend long periods of time civilly 
committed without any effective mechanism of review of the conditions of that detention. 95  The 
Court leaves these questions for another day given that PS had been detained for 19 years. 
However the Court’s rationale applies just as persuasively to review tribunals that are 
considering shorter-term commitments and reviewing patients who are on extended leave or 
released on CTO’s. We can think of no other context where deprivations of liberty are allowed to 
continue unchecked for up to six months before a full panoply of section 7 rights take effect.96 
While the PS Court recognized that by limiting its analysis to long-term detention, it opened the 
door to future challenges about whether the failure to have an administrative tribunal with a 
broad-based supervisory role is constitutional for shorter periods of commitment.  There are two 
arguments against extending the CCB jurisdiction to all civil commitments.  First, because the 
numbers of short-term commitments is much larger, the cost would correspondingly increase.  
We do not feel this is an acceptable reason for denying the vindication of section 7 rights.  The 
second argument against extending jurisdiction to this group of individuals is that it might 
                                                
95 We note here the more robust view of the Supreme Court of Canada when describing the appropriate supervisory 
role of a Nova Scotia Provincial Court judge in the context of the continuing supervision of a “protection order” for 
a vulnerable adult, authorized by that province’s Adult Protection Act RSNS 1989, c. 2: 
 
The significance of independent judicial review of state action when a vulnerable adult has been deprived, 
at the instigation of the state, of the right to function autonomously, cannot be overstated. The court’s 
statutorily assigned supervisory role emerges from the adult’s vulnerability.  The corollary of a judicial 
determination that an adult is in need of protection is a corresponding limitation on that adult’s autonomous 
decision making and liberty.  It is the function of the court to monitor the scope of that limitation.  The 
legislation must, therefore, be interpreted in a way which acknowledges the intrusiveness of the 
determination and offers muscular protection from state intervention incompatible with the adult’s welfare. 
 
JJ v Nova Scotia (Minister of Health), 2005 SCC 12, at para 23 (per Abella J.).   
96  In the very different context of security certificates under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001, 
c. 27, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an argument by the federal government that sought to justify the denial 
of detention review for foreign nationals for a period of six months, finding such a delay to violate fundamental 
justice in section 7.  See Charkaoui et al v Canada, (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 SCC 9, at paras 91-92.   
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unduly interfere with treatment goals of the treating physician for shorter-term commitments.  
We believe this problem can be minimized by, for example, limiting the number of times an 
individual could access the extended powers of the CCB, just as Ontario has already done for 
long-term commitments. 
Given that the distinction between those detained longer than six months and those 
detained for shorter periods is somewhat arbitrary, we are also concerned that in limiting its 
solution to long-term detainees, Ontario may have exposed it statute to possible challenge under 
section 15 of the Charter, the equality rights provision.  Ontario’s decision to establish a new set 
of powers for the CCB with respect to individuals subject to continuation certificates creates a 
“benefit” or, more aptly, a “protection of the law” that is denied to those on shorter periods of 
commitment. This statutory distinction arguably discriminates on grounds of disability in 
violation of section 15(1) of the Charter.  This is ironic given the strong equality rights thrust 
that underpinned the facts in PS, and that was vindicated in the Court of Appeal’s striking 
judgment on the section 15(1) issue. The equality rights issue as it concerns long-term and short-
term commitments is of a different nature. Whereas the issue in an Eldridge-type case deals with 
the failure of public authorities to accommodate the needs of a disadvantaged group in order for 
them to participate in equal benefit and protection of the law—what is often referred to as 
“adverse effect discrimination”—the limiting of access to the new powers of the CCB to long-
term commitments is more an instance of “direct discrimination.” The distinction in law is clear 
on the face of the statute, and is drawn between different groups of persons with mental 
disabilities, based on legal status while hospitalized and length of stay in a psychiatric facility. 
Jurisprudence on section 15(1) is clear that discrimination claims can be based on differential 
treatment in law between sub-groups sharing the same overall enumerated or analogous 
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characteristic.97  The more difficult question in a section 15(1) challenge to the denial of access 
to the protections afforded by section 41.1(2) of the Act would be whether the distinction is 
discriminatory in the sense of compounding disadvantages experienced by that person, through 
prejudice, stereotyping or otherwise.98 While the government would presumably argue that the 
additional protections afforded to those subject to continuation certificates correspond to a need 
for enhanced supervision of treatment planning past the point of diagnosis and early application 
of therapeutic interventions, this position might be less persuasive with respect to individuals 
with a history of frequent or multiple recent involuntary committals. This is especially true when 
considering the newly added power of the CCB to order the director of a facility to provide a 
person with “vocational, interpretation or rehabilitative services.” It should be noted that this 
power speaks most directly to the equality rights interest raised by the PS case, and can be seen 
as a means of ensuring that those interests must not be neglected. The fact that these protections 
are needed for long-term commitments does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that they are 
unnecessary for commitments of less than six months.   
This discussion of the equality problem in the amended Ontario legislation is not 
intended to suggest that a section 15 challenge to this otherwise important reform legislation is 
imminent or would be straightforward.  But nor can the government rely on the PS decision to 
insulate its distinction between short and long-term commitments.  The Ontario Court of Appeal 
does not mandate such a distinction in its decision.  Rather, it was confronted by a man who had 
been civilly committed for 19 years and did not need to address short-term commitments.  It thus 
limited its judgment based on the six-month cutoff period.  It explicitly leaves open the 
                                                
97  Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v Laseur, 
2003 SCC 54, [2003] 2 SCR 504 [Martin]; Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v British Columbia (Attorney General), 
2004 SCC 78, [2004] 3 SCR 657; Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203, 
173 DLR (4th) 1. 
98  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 SCR 61, per Abella J writing for a majority on this point.  
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possibility that further protections are necessary for short-term commitments.  It held that longer-
term commitments require more, it did not hold that short-term commitments do not.   
 
IV.  Moving Beyond PS 
 
A. Restraint and Seclusion Within Psychiatric Facilities  
The conclusion in PS that long-term civil commitment requires tribunal review of treatment 
and discharge planning implicitly raises the question of whether there are other section 7 liberty 
interests in civil commitment that call for enhanced administrative oversight and review. In our 
view, there is at least one other area that comes distinctly within the ambit, that of the use of 
“disciplinary” or behaviour control measures within the hospital setting, particularly the use of 
physical restraint and seclusion. These are issues which have come under increasing scrutiny in 
Canada and elsewhere, both in prison and hospital settings. In Canada, the 2013 coroner’s 
inquest into the death by self-strangulation of Ashley Smith, a young woman with a history of 
mental health issues who while held in the corrections system was subject to extended periods in 
solitary confinement, resulted in jury recommendations going to strict limits being placed on the 
use of seclusion.99 Two Charter challenges to solitary confinement in the prison context have 
also been initiated, one in BC and one in Ontario.100  The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment has concluded that even short 
periods of seclusion for people with mental disabilities may constitute torture and ill-
                                                
99 For the response by the federal Corrections Canada to the inquest report, see “Response to the Coroner's Inquest 
Touching the Death of Ashley Smith” Ottawa, December 2014, online at: http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/publications/005007-9011-eng.shtml#4.0  (accessed August 22, 2015). 
100 See: John Ivison, “Group launching legal challenge to limit use of solitary confinement in Canadian prisons”, 
National Post (19 January 2015) online: National Post <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/group-launching-
legal-challenge-to-limit-use-of-solitary-confinement-in-canadian-prisons>. Sean Fine, “Ontario government sued for 





treatment.101 The Special Rapporteur also notes that there can be no therapeutic justification for 
the prolonged use of restraints.102 
The use of restraint and seclusion in psychiatric hospital facilities is a well-known 
phenomenon. The measures continue to be used in Canadian psychiatric facilities, including in 
Ontario.103 While subject to government and hospital policies and protocols, concerns have long 
been expressed that the mechanisms for enforcing compliance with policies are informal and 
uneven.104 If additional powers are to be given to mental health tribunals, it would seem 
appropriate to include the ability to review and report on, and direct changes with respect to the 
use of these highly invasive, and largely unreviewable, measures.          
 
B. Charter Jurisdiction of Mental Health Tribunals 
The discussion of restraint and seclusion leads to an issue that was raised before the 
Court of Appeal in PS: whether the tribunal should be given jurisdiction to grant section 24(1) 
Charter remedies. An intervener in PS v Ontario, the Mental Health Legal Committee, sought to 
                                                
101 UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, UNGAOR, 23rd Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (1 February 2013) at para 63 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A.HRC.22.53_English.pdf> 
accessed 31 January 2016. The Special Rapporteur has addressed the issue of solitary confinement and stated that its 
imposition, of any duration, on persons with mental disabilities is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Any 
restraint on people with mental disabilities for even a short period of time may constitute torture and ill-treatment 
and it is essential that an absolute ban on all coercive and non-consensual measures, including restraint and solitary 
confinement of people with psychological or intellectual disabilities, should apply in all places of deprivation of 
liberty, including in psychiatric and social care institutions. 
102 UN General Assembly, Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: note | by the 
Secretary-General, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess, UN Doc A/63/175 (28 July 2008) at paras 55-56 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/48db99e82.html> accessed 31 January 2016. The Special Rapporteur notes that 
there can be no therapeutic justification for the prolonged use of restraints, which may amount to torture or ill-
treatment. The Special Rapporteur also notes that prolonged solitary confinement and seclusion of persons may 
constitute torture or ill treatment. 
103 Tina M Mah, John P Hirdes, George Heckman, and Paul Stolee, “Use of control interventions in adult in-patient 
mental health services.” (2015) 28 Healthcare Management Forum 139. 
104 H Archibald Kaiser, “Restraint and Seclusion in Canadian Mental Health Facilities: Assessing the Prospects for 
Improved Access to Justice”, (2001) 19 Windsor Access to J YB 391. For a recent discussion of the constitutional 
implications of the use of restraint and seclusion in the US, see Jeremy Weltman, Roderick MacLeish and Jacquelyn 
Bumbaca, “Deference Does Not Equal Abdication: Application of Youngberg to Prolonged Seclusion and Restraint 
of the Mentally Ill”, (2015) 26 Stanford Law & Policy Review 239.  
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have the Court of Appeal order that the CCB be given this jurisdiction. The Court declined to 
make such an order, in part because it would involve overruling an earlier decision of the 
Divisional Court.105 
The idea of extending Charter jurisdiction to civil mental health tribunals is an intriguing 
one. Section 24(1) authorizes a “court of competent jurisdiction” to order such remedies “as the 
court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances” to address the breach of an 
individual’s Charter rights by state action. The Supreme Court of Canada has stated on several 
occasions that section 24(1) contemplates the power to order creative remedies, responding to the 
wide range of circumstances in which an individual may have his or her rights infringed by 
statutory delegates (but not by legislation).106 The appeal of recognizing section 24(1) 
jurisdiction in a civil mental health tribunal like the CCB is that it would permit a flexible 
response to those situations in which civilly committed individual’s Charter rights, including 
section 7 liberty interests, were compromised. It would obviate the need for statutory definition, 
and anticipation, of the myriad circumstances in which this might occur, including such 
circumstances as the over-reliance on restraint and seclusion measures.107 
This begs the question of how civil mental health tribunals might come to possess section 
24(1) powers.  It is clear that civil mental health tribunals will be presumed to be “courts of 
competent jurisdiction” for purposes of section 24(1) provided that they have jurisdiction over 
                                                
105  Ontario (AG) v Jane Patient, (2005) 250 DLR (4th) 697 [Jane Patient]. 
106  See for example, Doucet‑Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3 and 
Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 28.  
107  For an excellent discussion of the Charter jurisdiction of civil and forensic mental health review tribunals prior 
to PS v Ontario, see Joaquin Zuckerberg, “Jurisdiction of Mental Health Tribunals to Provide Positive Remedies: 
Application, Challenges and Prospects” (2011) 57:2 McGill LJ 267. Zuckerberg concludes that despite the 
broadening of Charter jurisdiction of administrative tribunals, in general, promised by Martin and Conway, nothing 
had significantly changed with respect to civil mental health tribunals. He notes that civil mental health tribunals in 
Canada generally lack the jurisdiction to make rulings about ongoing treatment and supervision matters that are 
granted to forensic review boards under the Criminal Code. “Rather”, he states, “their jurisdiction is generally 
restricted to confirming decisions to civilly commit a person and findings of incapacity to consent to medical 
treatment.” This underlies the ruling in Jane Patient, supra note 106. 
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issues of law.108 That presumption could be rebutted by express legislative withdrawal of 
Charter jurisdiction, or by a clear implication of such intent derived from statutory limits on a 
tribunal’s role and logistical functioning.109 The legislatures of Alberta and British Columbia 
have enacted blanket provisions withdrawing Charter jurisdiction for most tribunals within their 
jurisdiction, including civil mental health tribunals.110 Ontario has also withdrawn Charter 
jurisdiction from the CCB with respect to civil commitment and CTO reviews.111 It would 
appear then that these tribunals are precluded from having the power to order section 24(1) 
remedies so long as the legislature maintains its prohibition.112 However, there is an issue as to 
whether this denial of Charter jurisdiction to civil mental health tribunals is constitutional, and 
therefore whether a challenge to that statutory withdrawal could instead provide tribunals with 
section 24(1) jurisdiction.  
In Martin, the Supreme Court of Canada based its finding of a rebuttable presumption 
that tribunals with jurisdiction generally over issues of law have Charter jurisdiction on the logic 
of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 52(1) states that any law which is 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid and of no force or effect. The Court stated that this 
means that statutory decision-makers who have the authority to interpret and apply law must 
refuse to enforce a law they deem unconstitutional. This is inconsistent with the idea that 
legislators have carte blanche to decide whether any particular tribunal has Charter jurisdiction 
                                                
108 Conway, supra note 74 at para 78. 
109 Martin, supra note 98. 
110 Administrative Procedures and Jurisdiction Act, RSA 2000, c A-3, s 11, and Designation of Constitutional 
Decision Makers Regulation, AB Reg 69/2006; and Administrative Tribunals Act, SBC 2004, c 45, ss 44, 45, and 
Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 24.2. 
111 See s 70.1 of the Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996, c 2, Sched A, which was enacted pursuant to SO 2006, c 
19, Sched L, s 2. 
112 Professor Kaiser has argued that the logic of Conway extends to provincial mental health tribunals.  He argues 
that the availability of the Charter “should provide enhanced access to justice in settings where it has been difficult 
to invoke the protection of the law, let alone the Charter.  These tribunals vitally affect the dignity, liberty and living 
conditions of institutionalized persons.  Before Conway, the exercise of discretion by clinicians and administrators 
was virtually invisible and unchallengeable…” Kaiser, “Conway: A Bittersweet Victory”, supra note 80 at 243.   
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(or constitutional jurisdiction generally), irrespective of the tribunal’s place in the legal system, 
its importance with respect to access to justice, and the breadth of its role in interpreting law. 
Justice Gonthier, writing for the Court in Martin, appeared to acknowledge this problem in the 
following passage: 
 I refrain, however, from expressing any opinion as to the constitutionality of a 
provision that would place procedural barriers in the way of claimants seeking to 
assert their rights in a timely and effective manner, for instance by removing 
Charter jurisdiction from a tribunal without providing an effective alternative 
administrative route for Charter claims.113 
 
The reference to an “effective alternative administrative route” appears not to include recourse to 
superior courts on constitutional matters, which is otherwise always available.  As noted by 
Justice Sharpe in PS, individuals detained in psychiatric facilities face particular challenges in 
asserting their rights and in accessing the courts. 
In a second and related submission, Ontario argues that where a patient wishes to 
challenge a committal on grounds that fall outside the powers of the CCB, there 
are alternate procedures available to fill any perceived gap. The patient can 
initiate proceedings in the Superior Court, resort to internal complaint procedures 
within the hospital, complain about doctors and nurses to the appropriate 
professional colleges or invoke the process established by the Human Rights 
Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, with respect to complaints about a failure to 
accommodate a disability. 
 
If we were to accept this submission, the appellant, a person who suffers from a 
mental disorder and a serious disability and who is held in a maximum security 
institution, would have to initiate proceedings in two or more different tribunals. 
This solution is fatally flawed; it is legally inadequate and practically unworkable. 
It would be prohibitively costly, very slow, seriously inconvenient and almost 
certainly ineffective.114 
 
While Justice Sharpe was directing his comments to the absence of an administrative mechanism 
to raise issues related to overall treatment planning, access to a forum to pursue Charter rights 
                                                
113 Martin, supra note 98 at para 44. 
114 PS, supra note 8 at paras 118-119.  
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encounters the same barriers for individuals confined in a psychiatric facility. A constitutional 
challenge might well be available with respect to the denial of Charter jurisdiction to mental 
health tribunals, or to any other administrative agency with supervisory authority over 
psychiatric facilities, if those entities do not provide “effective alternative administrative” routes. 
The arena in which these tribunals and agencies operate is one in which Charter rights, 
particularly section 7 rights, are implicated on a regular basis. The populations whose rights are 
at risk of infringement are particularly vulnerable, and have limited means to access other 
avenues for recourse as well as legal counsel. Therefore, it might be that the CCB and other 
review tribunals are precisely the kind of entities that should be able to rule on and remediate 
individual Charter breaches.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The decision in PS has the potential to prompt amendments to civil commitment statutes 
across Canada since no mental health statute currently meets the criteria that the Court of Appeal 
has prescribed. We would hope that provincial legislatures would treat this decision as a message 
that it is time to move towards treating civilly committed individuals as rights holders, entitled to 
the same procedural protections as other individuals detained by the state. However, if past 
experience is any indication, doing nothing is the most likely response by most provincial 
legislators, as the rights of civilly detained individuals have never been given priority.  Failure to 
respond proactively to PS would put the onus on those detained in psychiatric facilities to initiate 
Charter challenges to bring about reform.  There has been a dearth of litigation regarding mental 
health tribunals outside of Ontario. Even the refusal to allow competent civilly committed 
individuals to decline treatment in British Columbia and Newfoundland, a denial that raises 
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serious Charter concerns115 have not yet been subject to a Charter challenge despite the 
compelling reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Fleming v Reid.116  There are huge 
institutional barriers to having these matters litigated, not the least of which is a profound lack of 
funding as well as difficulties with mootness where potential plaintiffs are decertified or released 
before their cases are heard by a court.117  
As a result of the PS decision, the legislative scheme for long-term detainees in Ontario 
has changed for the better.  However, the government chose reforms that would give rights to the 
smallest possible number of civilly committed individuals and left open the possibility of 
manipulating the regime by decertifying individuals for a short period of time.  A better option 
for all committals would be to develop a civil mental health tribunal with a role and structure 
similar to that which now exists in forensic psychiatric systems across this country.  The tribunal 
should have explicit Charter jurisdiction, and detained individuals should be guaranteed the right 
to paid counsel.  Ontario’s recognition of the need for a tribunal role in protecting the liberty 
interests of involuntarily long-term detained individuals should serve as a beacon to that 
evolution.    
                                                
115 Simon Verdun-Jones & Michelle Lawrence, “The Charter Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Laws of Ontario and British Columbia Concerning the Right of Mental Health Patients to Refuse 
Psychiatric Treatment” (2013) 46 UBC L Rev 2.   
116 The Ontario Court of Appeal in its landmark decision in Fleming v Reid, supra note 4, put significant constraints 
on the province with respect to limiting prior expressed wishes of a competent individual regarding psychiatric 
treatment. 
117 This in fact happened in PS with the appellant's involuntary status allowed to lapse and the CCB thus losing 
jurisdiction over his detention. The appellant argued unsuccessfully that he would be recertified if he attempted to 
leave and thus that the Board should have taken jurisdiction. Because this is such a common practice, courts are 
sometimes willing to decide moot cases in this context. See, for example, McCorkell, supra note 6. 
